When Drug-Use Claims Meet a Plea Appeal Waiver

On November 4, 2026, the Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal in a federal criminal case after enforcing a plea agreement’s appeal waiver. In United States v. Mohamed, No. 25-3265, a memorandum disposition marked not for publication, the court held that Mohamed Abdirisak Mohamed’s written waiver covered his challenge to the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Read the decision (PDF). The panel also concluded that the district court did not clearly err when it found the waiver knowing and voluntary.

What happened

Mohamed appealed from a conviction and sentence in the Western District of Washington (case No. 2:23-cr-00053-RAJ-2). He contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing. His theory was that the plea was involuntary because he was under the influence of drugs during plea negotiations and at the change-of-plea hearing.

The government responded that Mohamed had waived appellate rights in a written plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government on waiver and dismissed the appeal.

The disposition states that it is not precedent except as provided under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

How the court reviewed the waiver

The panel reviewed the waiver de novo. It cited United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2022). It explained that a waiver is enforceable when (1) the waiver language covers the grounds raised on appeal, and (2) the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made, citing United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2005)).

The opinion also notes that if the waiver did not apply, the court would review denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Hernandez, 105 F.4th 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2024).

Why the waiver reached this issue

Mohamed’s agreement waived appeal broadly. The court quotes the clause: he waived “all rights to appeal from [his] conviction, and any pretrial rulings of the Court, and any rulings of the Court made prior to entry of the judgment of conviction.”

The panel then states it has “consistently read broad, general waivers of appellate rights to cover all appeals, including appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,” citing Rahman, 642 F.3d at 1259.

Knowing and voluntary waiver

The court separately considered whether the plea, including the waiver, was knowing and voluntary.

Mohamed pointed to a declaration from new counsel that he was under the influence and identified drugs, plus Bureau of Prisons disciplinary records from about one month after the guilty plea showing possession and influence of drugs.

The government submitted a declaration from prior counsel stating that after sixteen months of representation, including during the relevant period, he “did not seem to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs” and that counsel believed she would have noticed anything out of the ordinary.

The opinion adds that at the change of plea, the district court questioned Mohamed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, and that he “affirmatively stated that he understood and agreed to waive his rights to appeal.”

After reviewing the record, the court concluded Mohamed did not meet his burden to show the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. It also concluded the district court did not clearly err in its credibility assessment and could credit Mohamed’s plea-colloquy statements and prior counsel’s account over contrary arguments. It cited United States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2003), and Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989), quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), for the proposition that “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”

From my perspective

This disposition turns on two parallel ideas that show up often after a guilty plea: how far a written appeal waiver reaches, and how much a later attack on the plea must overcome the plea colloquy on the record.

The Ninth Circuit’s discussion ties the drug-influence claim to the voluntary-waiver inquiry, not to a merits review of withdrawal that would skip the waiver. The opinion does not decide whether Mohamed would have won withdrawal on the facts if the waiver did not apply; it ends once the waiver stands.

For how a plea agreement can limit sentencing appeals more generally, see writ time credit locked in by an appeal waiver. For the Supreme Court’s discussion of when an appeal waiver may not be enforced in a sentencing appeal, see Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063 (June 18, 2026) (slip op.).